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This study examines the two world crises, climate change and the financial meltdown, 
followed by an economic depression, and compares how t ey can be managed. Climate 
change has set in and to most probability it will cause immensly big damage, human suffer 
and loss. Still, for the time being international community is not suited to avoid it. In contrast 
to this, huge efforts, including international co-ordination, are made to combat the financial 
and economic crisis. This comparison is astonishing: why is there a sudden solution for the 
one, and why there is not for the other?  
As concerns climate stabilization the main question is whether present mainstream 
economics, interest relations, moral patterns and iternational institutions give an adequate 
framework for the solution. The economic crisis also raises basic questions concerning 
mainstream economics and economic policy: Can bankers’ greed be tamed or it is part of the 
system? Are crises inevitable? Can better co-ordnatio  on the international level solve the 
problem? The combination of the management of the two crises is also examined: whether is 
there a green way out from the crisis. But to save the world economy via a green energy 
revolution also seems to be a questionable enterprise. 
 
Keywords: financial crisis, climate crisis, manageable, unmanageable, green way out, 
regulated capitalism, temporary taming 
 
Was the Earth a bank, it has been 
already bailed out long ago. 
(the Greens) 
1. Climate crisis 
In the Intergovernmental Panel on Cimate Change of the UN experts of almost all 
countries participate on an equal parity. The credibility of the reports is underlined 
by the fact that they are published when unanimity was reached. Reports of the year 
2006, and especially that of Feruary 2007 contain very depressing statements. The 
most importants ones are as follows (IPCC 2007): 
- Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the 
mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations  
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- The observed widespread warming of the atmosphere and ocean, together 
with ice mass loss, support the conclusion that it is extremely unlikely that 
global climate change of the past fifty years can be explained without external 
forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known natural causes alone. 
- Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries due to 
the timescales associated with climate processes and feedbacks, even if 
greenhouse gas concentrations were to be stabilized.  
- Both past and future anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will continue to 
contribute to warming and sea level rise for more than a millennium, due to 
the timescales required for removal of this gas from the atmosphere.  
 
The expressions very likely and extremely unlikely have not yet been occured 
in the IPCC reports; they express a new stage of scientific conviction. A figure from 
the referred IPCC report demonstrates temperature va iations in function of the 
world economy development. What does matter here is that even without any 
antropogenic green house gas emission surface temperature slightly increases, by  
0,3 centigrade in this century. Warming up has already become „self-sustaining”. 
Temperature increase due antropogenic emissions may vary from minimum 1 to 
maximum 6,5 centigrades. 
We have started a natural process what we cannot stop anymore. Positve 
feedbacks emerge: with warming up ice cover is melting, the albedo of the Earth 
decreases, warming up further increases. The melting of permafrost also has begun 
which results in escaping to the air of an immensly big volume of methane from the 
frozen swamps. Its green house gas effect is many times more than that from 
antropogenic activity. With the slow warming up of the seas methane is also coming 
up from the organic residuals on the bottom of the seas. 
What is at stake now is the measure of warming up. Scientists should like to 
stabilize temperature increase at 2 centigrade. Above that the damage of ecosystems 
becomes irreparable and warming up unhaltable. We must have in mind that average 
surface temperature during the ice age was only 5 centigrade lower. Let us imagine, 
what could happen with a similar change in the opposite direction. (And forecasts 
for the end of the century vary between 1,5 and 6,5 centigrade.) 
The Stern Review on Climate Change (Stern 2006) in October 2006 revealed 
completely new facts concerning the costs and benefits o  climate stabilization. 
Earlier, leading politicians and economists thought that mitigation should not have 
two much sense because there would be winners of the climate change as well and 
costs of avoidance should be extremely high in contrast to gains. The report proved 
that even Nordic countries would be losers after an initial gain and benefits of 
mitigation far overtake costs. Namely,while preventio  should claim for roughly 1 
per cent of World Gross Product yearly, in the lack of it 5 to 20 per cent of WGP 
would be lost in every year for ever. (For illustration: the costs of prevention of a 
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world epidemic should be roughly l per cent of WGP, or world wide advertisement 
costs make up the same amount.) 
Observing the principle of auditur et altera pars, let us mention some opposing 
views1. These views are forming three groups: those which question the fact of 
climate change itself, others object to its antropogenic character (Hans Labohm, 
Fred Singer), and, thirdly, which do not deny the antropogenic climate change but 
not rank it as first priority for mankind. Björn Lomborg Danish environmentalist 
lately emphasises that the the envisaged costs of climate stabilization should be 
spent on supporting poor countries, combatting famine or AIDS in Eastern Africa 
(Lomborg 2007). 
For many, like myself, James Lovelock is the author number one in climate 
affairs. He evaluates the possible consequences even more heavily than the Stern 
Review. While the latter says that consequences might equal as those of a world 
war, Lovelock adds that as a global nuclear war. According to him half a billion, but 
maximum one billion people could survive climate change by the end of our 
century. In an interview given by him to Rollingsotne.com, he explained that even if 
mitigation measures will have a high profile, the warming up could not be stopped 
(Goodell 2007). Earlier, Lovelock thought that the massive use of nuclear energy, 
replacing the fossils may save mankind but in this interview he saw no solution. 
At last, the question of adaptation should be mentioned. As concerns nature 
and species, many think that it is possible, but the process of climate change will 
accelerate and all this will take place in such a short time, that genetic adaptation 
would be absolutely impossible. As concerns people and nations, the richest will 
have better chances to survive but the poor will vanish. 
 
1.1. The theoretical framework of analysis2 
We should examine whether economics and social sciences in their present form are 
apt to manage the problem. The climate change raises serious challanges in the 
following aspects: 
- intra and intergenerational unequities, 
- intertemporal unequities, 




The centrepiece of mainstream economics is welfare economics. Welfare 
economics is designed to be implemented within one country, supposing one 
                                                   
1 This is based even if we only want to follow the criteria of science by Karl Popper (namely, it is 
scientific, what can be questioned). 
2 This point roughly follows the argument exposed in the Stern Review. 
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jurisdiction and one decision maker (government) and it is not apt to examine 
climate change, due to its global character. Its mot important criterion is the social 
welfare function, meaning that welfare is maximal when the volume of goods and 
services sonsumed by households is maximum. The welfare function also can be 
interpreted only within one country, besides, it has a serious shortcoming from the 
point of view of the examined question. Namely, the social welfare function can be 
maximized at any (!) income distribution pattern. But implementing the social 
welfare function for the effects of climate change it would be unacceptable to defend 
mankind from the natural catastrophe in the way that only global effect matters, the 
differences in damages suffered by the single countries were neglected. 
The ruling economic paradigm is equally unapt to manage uncertainties and 
risks. To the contrary, it is embedded in positivism, trying to quantify everithing, not 
taking account that economics is not a discipline without values. But analysing the 
effects of climate change, uncertainties and risks have an enormous importance.  
In most cases effects and damages to come can be fixed only within wide limits and 
given with a high coefficient of uncertainty. 
The concepts which can bring us to our purpuse, to find the proper framework 
for the analysis, are externalities, public goods and free riding. It is because, 
- the climate itself is a huge, global common good, the service of ecosystems, 
- climate change is the world’s biggest externality so far (never has been seen 
something similar), 
- but climate stabilization policy is also a public good (as nobody could be 
excluded to enjoy its benefits), 
- and free riding emerges with an all decisive weight: countries that make no 
effort will also enjoy the benefits of climate mitigation policies. 
 
As a result, these concepts should be reinterpreted, implemented in global 
dimensions: 
- The climate change as a global externality means that we should cover not 
only damages caused to others in our country and now, but we are responsible 
for damages caused in other countries and other continents, to other 
generations and in the future as well. 
- Climate mitigation as global externality means that success can be achieved 
only by international co-operation, and the free-ride s are the countries who 
do not participate in it. The international community has not any enforcing 
powers so far on the dissident countries and efforts will be fruitless while 
institutional solution will be born to include all the countries.  
 
One of the many theoretical problems appears in the field of discounting. 
According to the well known method used in business calculations comparing and 
unifying costs and benefits accruing not in the same time are made through 
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discounting. Future benefits and/or expenses are expressed in present value with the 
help of discount rate and they can be compared this way. It seems to be evident that 
this method should be used in case of climate change s well, if we want to compare 
damages accruing in different places and times and costs and benefits of a climate 
stabilization policy which similarly appear in different times and places. But heavy 
methodological problems appear because the traditional discounting is apt only for 
comparing small scale differences by one trayectory, while in case of climate issues 
there are separate trayectories (countries, regions, affected by the climate change in 
a very different way) and separate time dimensions (present and future generations) 
and differences are huge. 
All this is raising underlying moral and ethical problems: how to evaluate in 
the present damages caused unintentionally to other countries in the future; are we 
fully responsible or each country, each generation and each age should solve its own 
problem. The discount rate chosen depends on the moral answer given to this 
question. If it is high, it delivers a message that today’s value of the damages 
accruing in the future is low, and as a result, it has not too much sense to make high 
sacrifice today to avoid it in the future and other places. And vice versa: if the 
discount rate is low, today’s efforts should be increased to avoid big damages in the 
future. 
Surveying the moral facade of our age we can state th t consequentionalism, 
the background ethics of welfare economics has becom  the ruling orientation: it is 
the result, which does matter, the way through which it is achieved, is not important. 
The concept based on rights, truth and freedom, embracing the moral side of the 
processes as well (see at Amartya Sen), remains in minority. From the point of view 
of our topic the moral concept of sustainability and stewardship should rule that 
everybody should take into consideration the effects of decisions on others, the 
nature and future, this way enabling us to follow a successful climate stabilization 
policy. 
1.2. International climate agreements 
Climate stabilization can be pursued on internationl, regional, national and 
company levels, but individuals also can make a lot in favour. With a view on the 
above mentioned conditions, the most efficient instrument is the conclusion of 
international agreement. All we know the Kyoto Protocol and its shortcomings.  
If there is not a binding and general international agreement, which comprises all the 
important countries with high emissions, the phenomenon of free riding appears, the 
system is „leaking” and is inefficient3. Countries with obligation in the Kyoto 
                                                   
3 To illustrate this: if Great Britain unilaterally stopped all its energy power plants from one day to the 
other, after 13 months world emission of CO2 would be on the same level as before, because it would 
be eliminated by the growing emission of China. But if Great Britain ceased to emit any CO2, it would 
take 2 years for the world to reach the same level by the same reasons. 
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process undertook a 5,2 per cent average reduction. And those with the biggest 
emissions did not subscribe it. According to a general position, held by all countries 
a 50-80 per cent reduction is needed by the middle of the centrury. As a result, the 
situation is very gloomy. 
The mitigation measures may be of economic, administrat ve, technological 
or other character (e.g. an economic policy supporting local development vis-á-vis 
globalization; such a policy would yield in lower transport intensity and hence, 
lower CO2 emission). 
Within the frames of an international agreement the best instrument for 
achieveing the mitigation targets would be the emission trading scheme. It can be 
realized both within the Kyoto Protocol and the EU has also created its own quota 
system. However, the international implementation is doomed, because there is no 
agreement, on what principle the qoutas should be distributed between the different 
states. (There are many principles, and each represnt different interests which 
widely contrast. E.g., qoutas should be distributed proportianal to the former 
emissions, or the number of inhabitants or the energy intensity of GDP, etc.) 
The main frontline is between the US and the emerging countries, headed by 
China and India. (By now, China has reached the total emission of America.) China 
and India rightly argue that their CO2 per capita emission is only a fraction of the 
US. (Namely, 3,3 and 1,1 tonne respectively, vis-á-vis the 23 tonne per capita of the 
US.)4. Besides, they emphasize the historical responsibility of the developed nations 
in forming the present situation5. In contrast to this, America argues that obligations 
should be equally shared. What has been achieved during the negotiations within the 
UN is the principle of shared but differentiated responsibility (although not equal). 
A special case is Poland, which, on the one hand, has huge coal deposits, on the 
other, due to historical reasons, it does not want to be depending on Russian oil and 
gas. 
The all-decisive climate negotiations will take place in Kopenhagen, end of 
2009. Many call it as the most important negotiation in history so far. Perspectives 
are a bit better as in the USA itself there is a definit  progress towards climate 
protection. As concerns the US and West-European attitudes, the main difference is 
that while West Europe seems to consider possibilities n consumption reduction as 
well, the USA follows an active climate policy; it wants to defend climate by doing 
something, not by doing nothing (or less).  
A new element in the mitigation policy is the suggestion to implement game 
theory in the climate discussions. A conclusion which underlines this is that climate 
agreements for long periods are not productive because countries which do not sign 
                                                   
4 It should be mentioned that Malaysia, Indonesia and Brazil belong to the countries with highest 
emission, if land use is taken into consideration. 
5 USA is responsible for 29,3% of the total CO2 emissions since 1850, the European Union for 26,9% 
and the G8 for two thirds. The respective figures for other countries are: China 8,3%, India 2,3%, 
Brazil 0,8%. See: Schwägerl, 2009. 
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the agreement become fixed in the position of free rid rs. In the spirit of game 
theories during the continuous negotiations the dissi ents should be kept under 
permanent pressure and renegotiations may yield the result. 
1.3. The energy sector and climate change  
At last, some interrelations between energy and climate change should be 
highlighted. If scarecity was a real danger, environmentalists would have nothing to 
do just sitting and waiting how the market settles he problem. It should price fossil 
fuels according to scarecity and no enforcing measures should be needed. But this is 
not happening. New discoveries of large deposits make expected exploitation 
periods longer and longer. Besides, coal deposits seem to be enough for centuries, 
and the worst option for environmentalists would be, if China and India changed for 
coal, using it directly, without liquifying. Oil prices are sometimes soaring, but this 
is not a manifest of scarecity. (Take e.g. the two decades between 1980 and 2000, 
when oil prices gradually sank from 65 to 15 dollars, while the world permanently 
chatted about scarecity.) 
However, the solution lies in price increase. Final consumption prices of 
energy and raw materials should be increased in each year in the same measure as 
the productivity of these resources improved in the previous year6. This could limit 
the increase of energy use and promote its productivity. A good example of the 
viability of the idea is pricing labour in welfare states: price and costs of labour 
gradually increased during decades, parallel with labour productivity. As a result, 
demand for labour decreased, and the case of structural unemployment appeared in 
the developed countries. 
The frequent reference to low price elasticity of energy holds true only in the 
short run. In the long run the demand adjusts to prices, energy and fuel usage 
decreases, travel and transport habits change, demand for environmental friendly 
infrastructures increases. 
Another basic problem is the production of renewable energies: whether they 
could replace fossil fuels and on what prices. Theoretically, renewables are 
undepletable and the only limit of their implementation is their price7. And their 
pricing depends on the actual price of oil and whether externalities caused by fossil 
fuels are internalized. And this brings us to the issue of social cost of carbon. From 
among the many calculations and variations let me ref r to those I have herd 
recently in the concluding conference of the so called petrE research of the English-
German Foundation (petrE 2009). To comply with the 20 per cent GHG reduction 
target up to 2020 in the European Union, a €53-68 per tonne of carbon price would 
be needed, but the 30 per cent reduction would necessitate a €180-200 price. 
                                                   
6 This is an idea by Ulrich von Weizsäcker. 
7 In chapter 4. of this study I shall refer to the practical obstacles of the unlimited use of renewables. 
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We know the many (environmental and food market) problems of the biomass 
as well. As a result, the question seems to be more c mplex as it appeared at the 
beginning.  
 
Investment bankers  
may have nothing to gain  
but their chains 
(Karl Marx, inverted) 
2. Financial and economic crisis 
Alternative economists have been warning at least since 20 years that stock 
exchanges and international money markets are blowing ever increasing bubbles 
which are not covered by real values, bond and stock pri es are artificially inflated 
and the bubbles can burst out at any time. Well, this happened. 
The volume of derivatives grew to an uninmaginable huge sum, $596 trillion, 
which was only 142 billion in 2002. Gross World Product is a tiny sum compared to 
this, 54,3 trillion in 2007, only tenth part. Another base for comparison: total 
capitalization of firms on the New York stock exchange was $25.000 bn8. Warren 
Buffet, the richest investor of America calls derivat es as weapons of mass 
distructions. Besides derivatives, hedge funds also contributed to blowing the 
bubbles.  
A substantial part of derivatives is made of CDSs (credit-default swaps). 
These instruments „allow investors to separate the risk of interest-rate movements 
from the risk that a borrower will not repay. For a premium, one party to a CDS can 
insure against default.” The Economist rightly calls this financial „innovation” 
gambling on ruin. Since 2001 their volume grew above $60 trilllion9. Derivatives 
increased the weight of banks and financial institutions in an immense proportion; 
their share of the American stock market climbed from 5,2 per cent in 1980 to  
23,5 per cent in 2007 and makes ¼ of all profits10. 
As concerns the concrete causes of the financial meltdown, securitisation of 
the mortgages played a key role in it. The big mortgage banks, to share risk, 
securitized loans, bundling them into packages and then sold them to outside 
investors. These investors got the monthly payments as interest payments on their 
bonds. Both sides gained: the mortgage bank could write the obligations off its 
balance and the investors got assets that yielded more than government bonds. 
                                                   
8 Der Spiegel, 40/2008, p. 28. (In the original article: $596.000 milliard; in this paper I translate 
German milliard into English-American billion.) 
9 The Economist, October 18th 2008, p.76. 
10 I.e. 
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Besides, commercial banks could raise money by securitizing mortgages, instead of 
the slow, costly business of attracting retail deposits. 
The driving force of the housing estate boom was the beleif that the real estate 
market will continuously enlarge, with increasing prices and occasional individual 
defaults do not endanger stable repay. But the decline in demand and mass 
bankruptcies lowered real estate prices and this trigge ed off a chain reaction of 
defaults in the money markets. 
On 29 September the Dow Jones sank by 776,68 points, a  unprecedented 
decline since its existing. The MSCI World Index fell 840 points between 29 August 
and 29 September. The total value of papers traded on the stock exchanges of the 
world devaluated by $10.900 bn in the four weeks preceding 10 October. In the Gulf 
states stock exchanges suffered a $158 bn loss. Many of the big financial institutions 
and banks went bankrupt11. 
And that was the beginning of the world’s economic crisis. The financial 
losses were followed by a credit crunch and a mass lo  of confidence. Credit 
squeeze resulted in consequences similar to heart att ck in the economy: low 
demand, massive bankruptcies and high unemployment. 
2.1. The visible hand takes over the rule 
In the past decades, economics taught that a world crisis like that of 1929-32 could 
not happen again because national economies co-ordinate business cycles and 
international financial institutions guard over the safe of international finances. As 
the melt down began, governments of the leading countries started to help the 
economy and bail out the banks and financial institutions with an unprecedented 
haste: they have bought out the shares of banks in trouble, provided them with 
capital and credit sources, purchased their claims, rai ed state guarantees for small 
shareholders, etc. Central banks lowered interest rates to around 1 per cent in a quick 
and co-ordinated way. Still, the crisis burst out in its full scale with deep economic 
depression and high unemployment. 
The situation is absurd. In the past three decades th  ruling paradigm of 
economics, starting from the Anglo-Saxon countries12, has been preaching the 
superiority of market above the state. It has attribu ed balancing and efficiency 
increasing character to the market in contrast to the low effficiency and perilous 
character of state intervention... And now, it is the scolded state, the visible hand 
that saves the market, tries to improve what went astray due to the market. What is 
even more, the state becomes owner of the banks that went bankrupt. 
In the six months following the burst out of the crisis, $3000 bn has been 
allocated by the governments worldwide for stabilization and economic 
                                                   
11 Der Spiegel, 42/1980, p. 114. 
12 Developed by Milton Friedman and the Chicago School and first implemented by Ronald Reagan in 
the United States and Margaret Thatcher in the UK. 
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stimulation13. To characterize this, the Nobel laureate Stiglitz coined the expression 
„American socialism”, meaning socializing the losses and privatizing the profits. 
The American governement, besides the $700 bn stimulus package, assumed 
liability for the $5.400 bn mortgages of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and expended 
further $200 bn for taking under state control the two financial institutions. 
On October 8 2008, to start credit flow, the leading central banks of the world 
took on an unprecedentedly quick, co-ordinated action: decreased interest rates.  
The Fed increased short term money supply to banks to $900 bn and began to buy 
the liabilities of commercial banks what never happened before.  
2.2. Gambling and greed, or is this the nature of capitalism? 
The first comments criticized greed and gambling, dominating the world of finances. 
Rightly done, as all derivative deals are based on which of the parties reckon better 
future events. It is natural, that Alan Greenspan, the main financial guru of the past 
decades also has been seriously criticised.  
Greenspan presided the Fed for two decades (1987-2006) and not only 
accepted but openly encouraged those financial market developments and 
innovations which led to blowing of the bubbles and then to crush. He viewd 
derivatives as necessary instruments to spread risk. In 2000 he persuaded 
congressmen to deprive the Securities and Exchange Commission of its right to 
control the market of derivatives. In 2003 he instructed the Senate that a more severe 
control of these papers would be a mistake: „Nothing is in favour of that state 
control would be superior to the self-control of markets”14. His main political aim 
was to provide the American economy with abundant money, he realized the policy 
of cheap money supply. (In some years under his presidency the leading interest rate 
was 1-2-3 per cent.) Analysts mention as main causes of meltdown as follows: 
- Deregulation and market liberalization: since the beginning of the ’80s this 
was more than a ruling economic dogma; it was even intellectually 
fashionable. 
- Cheap money, cheap credit: this was the official policy of Fed.  
- Asian savings: the Asian (mainly Chinese) goods floded the American 
markets; this was made possible by the huge deficit of trade balance; beside 
this, the Asian savings appeared on the money markets. 
- The culture of gambling (Stiglitz) and irresponsibility became general; they 
were supported by the financial innovations as „intellectual background”; the 
system was called „cowboy capitalism” as well (Fukuyama). 
- The endeavour to spreading and sharing risk played a ecisive role. 
Greenspan frequently argued with this. The problem is that even if risks are 
spread, their volume remains unchanged and it is still in the system. 
                                                   
13 Der Spiegel, 43/2008, p. 29. 
14 Der Spiegel 42/2008, p. 28. 




It is worth to consider the case from the point of view of the banking and 
financial sector. Their strive for independence is an evident motive; to be more than 
the mere financing agents of the real economy. Let us see, e.g., the background of 
securitization of real estate mortgages. The classic l bank collects private savings by 
a tiresome work and uses them as backing credit loans. When the bank sold the 
securitized mortgages to the investor, freed its balance from a negative load and, at 
the same time, could get income. According to the 1988 Basel agreement, banks are 
obliged to form reserves for the case if their big orrowers go bankrupt. So it could 
be understood that they wanted to get rid of the negative items on their balance.  
With the passing of time analysis appeared that search d for the basic rules 
and shortcomings of the system. „Each step on the long deregulatory road seemed 
wise at the time and was usually the answer to some flaw in the system” – The 
Economist explains15. In 1971 the gold-standard world economy was put an end. 
Since then, floating currences appeared and to avoid exchange rate risks, they were 
hedged by currency futures (first in the Chicago Stck Exchange). Today’s complex 
derivatives are direct descendents of those early cu rency trades16. The abolishment 
of capital controls was a consequence of floating exchange rates. From the late ’70s 
pension funds were allowed to act as institutional i vestors and began to roam over 
national borders. In 1999 the separation of commercial and investment banking was 
abolished. The SEC allowed for commercial banks andinsurance institutions to 
trade in CDSs. These were the main steps on the long deregulatory road which led to 
the present situation. 
A further system-specific cause was the social preference of conservative 
ideologies. Both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher favoured the nation of 
property owners, and on liberalised financial markets it was easier for homebuyers 
to get mortgages. The American Government backed th borrowing activity of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, what is more, in 1977 the US Congress passed the 
Community Reinvestment Act which disposed that banks should meet the credit 
needs of the „entire community”.  
And, at last, the digital techniques and the web created the possibility for the 
multiplication of financial deals. 
2.3. Regulated capitalism or temporary taming? 
Many of the critiques began to bury free market capitalism and forecasted a future 
with accentuated state intervention. However, the French model of state dirigism is 
not so successful as suggested by some politicians17. And what is embarrasing, the 
                                                   
15 The Economist October 18th, 2008. 
16 It is not an accident that the Chicago School appeared in the vicinity of Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 
17 See e.g. The Economist, October 25th 2008. The stat  as owner. Re-bonjour, Monsieur Colbert. 
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political left, all over Europe, does not want to overthrow capitalism, despite 
economic decline and unemployment around 10 per cent. (What is more, in the 2009 
European Parliament elections the Left has been defetead in most countries.) 
Most leading economists and heads of international fi ncial organisations 
emphasize the need of better international co-ordinatio , arguing that the world 
economy has become global, while management remained mainly in the competence 
of nation states. No doubt, this is right. As concer s mainstream thinking, a 
revitalisation of Keynesianism is spreading. But it does not seem probable that state 
intervention goes beyond the bailing outs and buying outs of the shares and 
liabilities of bankrupted banks and financial isntitutions. I am inclined to accept the 
above analysis of The Economist and a very similar an lysis by the Newsweek18 that 
the crisis stems from the very nature and logics of functioning of capitalism. Free 
market logics realy needed those steps on the long r ad of deregulation. But it 
should also be admitted that the principles of the C icago School have frozen into 
dogmas and lived as intellectual fashion. 
A ruling opinion seems to appear from the turmoil: s nce the Thatcherite 
revolution and Reaganomics the Western world has experienced a lasting upswing 
of almost 30 years. This ended with a deep recession, h gh unemployment and huge 
stimulus packages of taxpayer money. This is irritating because the bankers, whose 
greed was one of the causes of the meltdown, now are b iled out. However, all this 
seems to be a fair price for the past three decades. 
My forecast is that of course, we shall have a period of accentuated state 
regulation, the visible hand may dominate for a while, as the confidence in the 
invisible hand has weakened. But if world economy was restaured and a new 
upswing began, we shall tread on the same or similar way as before. It is a misbelief 
that growth and stability were the normal state of the economy.The cyclical 
character of capitalist economy is unavoidable. 
The most characteristic feature of capitalism is the permanent growth of 
productivity and supply. The problem lies in the lagging demand. In the 70’s an 
originally thinking Hungarian economist, named Ferenc Jánossy illustrated this with 
the analogy of a well, which abundantly pours water without stop and cannot be 
closed (Jánossy 1975). (This stands for the ever-increasing productivity.) The main 
concern is to find the proper vessels to contain the water. I think, this will not be 
different in the future. The biggest problem will alw ys be how to increase demand. 
To stop, choke down and retrain production are contrary to the very nature of 
capitalism. Hence, regulation and limits cannot have  longlasting role. 
                                                   
18 Newsweek, October 13th, 2008. 
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3. Lessons from and conclusions of managing the two crises 
The time scale. No doubt, this is the major difference. What happens here and now 
and with us, is more important than that with others, later and there. Economics calls 
this time-preference and to compare effects taking place later and in other places 
uses discounting, counts present value. A similar effect is expressed by the law of 
decreasing marginal benefit: the more we consume something, the less will be the 
use of the additionally consumed units. 
It is our moral pattern, hidden behind these rules. The idleness and lameness 
against climate change is a moral issue. In contrast o this, the sudden reaction and 
activity to combat financial and economic crisis is not a moral issue; decision 
makers and leaders are not driven by the anxiety towards the fate of small people but 
they are concerned mostly of their own power and wealth. But in climate policy 
decisions not realized today do not mean a threat to their power and influence. 
Natural and financial capitals. We have still not accostumed to attribute a 
financial value to natural capital. Notwithstanding that the life supporting services of 
natural eco-systems make possible our life on the earth. Ecological economists have 
already long calculated that only the value of the water-cleaning service of the 
oceans approaches the Gross World Product19. According to an actual calculation, 
the yearly loss in natural capital is 2-3 times higher than the total capital loss due to 
the financial meltdown (Black 2009). 
Asymmetry of interests. Climate change will affect the poorest countries first 
of all, that are the less capable to protect against it. But the costs of climate 
stabilization today should charge, first of all, the richest countries (the biggest 
energy users) and the most powerful industries (energy, car manufacturing, 
chemicals, road building). The latter make an uncomparably srtonger coalition than 
the former ones. 
Unlike climate change, the finacial crisis affects rather the most developed 
countries (where the centres of international banks and money markets are located), 
and the drying out of credits affects everybody. To av id climate change it is the 
United States that should make the biggest sacrifices ( hange in lifestyles, modest 
housing conditions, less luxurious travels and energy use), therefore the US is the 
less interested in climate stabilization. In contrast to this, in combatting financial 
crisis the US is the most interested country, being the mostly concerned one20. 
State intervention. The comparison of the two crises rves as an interesting 
field for discussing on the character and necessity of state intervention. The standard 
welfare economics suggests state intervention in two cases: in case of market failure 
                                                   
19 Evaporation – the formation of clouds – precipitation makes, as a matter of fact, a huge distillation 
system; this is how nature cleans the dirty water of rivers discharged to the seas and replaces it with
clean water, delivered back to the continents. 
20 This held true for the beginning of the financial crisis. After, less developed countries were more 
affected. 
 Károly Kiss 
 
214
or if politics wants to achieve an income redistribution. Market failure appears in 
case of monopoly, lack of information or externalities. Climate change is caused by 
global externalities! According to the theory, externalities should be internalized, 
namely, if they are negative, the casual agents must bear the damage caused. Due to 
intervention, the volume of polluting/damaging activity will reduce and social-
economic optimum will be reached. All this will be the result of state intervention. 
Hence, according to the standard theory, to avoid climate change, state intervention 
is needed, but there is not enough of it. 
And what grounds does economic theory give for state intervention in case of 
financial crisis? To qualify financial damage and loss as externality would be 
evidently a nonsense, as they emerged as a result of regular market operations, 
derivatives do have their markets (alas, what a big market!), unlikely the emission of 
green house gases (because if there were a market of GHG emissions, the emitter 
should pay the total cost and in that case sould not be there a climate change)21.  
Nor can we speak about monopolies, as the financial cruntch was caused by the 
cheap credits, available for everybody. And if we dared to be involved in a 
discussion about the income-redistributive functions of the financial and credit 
systems, we would be lost in the terminology of a neo-Marxist discussion22.  
The lack of information – in contrast to the previous items – is something to ponder. 
On the one hand, the digital techniques and informatics create such an abundance of 
information – especially in finances - , which is inconceivable for human brains.  
On the other hand, there must be still lack of information, otherwise the crises could 
not come, there would be foresight. This seems to be a paradox, but it is not difficult 
to answer it: the capitalism, originating from its nature, is still a system, operated by 
uncontrollable and unforeseenable market forces in the last instance23. 
As a result, in the case of financial crisis state in rvention does not have the 
theoretical economic grounds, but it happens. 
Institutions. The financial crisis has also a globa character, like climate 
change, and the international financial network functions as a hydraulic system: may 
the pressure change at any point of the system, it can be felt at any other point24. 
Still, it is manageable because the proper internatio l institutions do exist. But the 
international institutions which are inevitable for an effective climate policy, are 
missing. Their creation is mostly hindered by the United States which has a counter-
                                                   
21 When speaking about externalities, instead of using the regular criteria, it is more simple and suitable 
to refer to that of Samuelson: an external effect is what the market cannot manage. 
22 Probably there are not many, especially among the young people who know, how the classical Soviet 
political economy defined inflation: a process, during which incomes are redistributed through price 
increases in favour of the capitalists. (And this is true!) 
23 A question can be asked retrospectively: could the former socialist central planning be improved by 
the abundance of information delivered by IT of ourage? The answer is probly no: the main deficiency 
of central planning was not the lack of information but the lack of proper material incentives for good 
management, technological development and labour productivity via high profits, wages and payments. 
24 An analogy by László Bogár. 
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interest in this. According to some experts, the lack of institutions can be replaced 
by the implementation of some elements of the game theory. 
Does environmental crisis correlate with financial and economic crisis?  
Of course, the answer cannot be negative in the age of lobalization. But the real 
question is whether does one of them aggravate the other, or how the solution of one 
helps the other.  
It is evident that in time of economic recession resource use and pollution are 
less, but this could be considered as postponed demand, which will be satisfied 
during the coming take off. The question that really does matter is that how an acute, 
unmanageable and prolonged climate crisis does affect th  economy and finances. 
This is the case we are having now. If environmental degradation will be further 
worsening, biodiversity suffering further damages, the life supporting capacity of the 
bioshere will further weakening. The apparent result of these processes will be the 
worsening of human health and decline in human production and activity. Let us 
refer again to the statements of the Stern review. In case of BAU 5-20 per cent of the 
Gross World Product will be lost, in every year, until the endless future. We cannot 
exlude that such a development could favour financial markets. Namely, one of the 
most important effects of climate change will be thimmensely growing risks and 
uncertainties. (Financial markets have already acquired experience in implementing 
CDSs to share risks.) On the other hand, risks and uncertainties (due to increased 
and more frequent weather irregularities) will be reflected in the large volatility of 
exchange rates and prices.  
But let us ask the other question too: How a successful and effective climate 
policy should affect the economy and the financial system? In practical terms, such a 
policy would mean the squeeze of the supply of energy and natural resources (or 
replacement of the fossil fuels with renewables). A switch off of the market 
mechanism is hailed only by biassed and badly informed environmentalists.  
The changed conditons could be imagined as a further limitation of the business 
sphere. In the welfare state public education and public health are out of the reach of 
the competitive sectors (and evidently, the traditional state adminsitration and 
services too). From that time on, part of the resource management and use of the 
environment will also be out of the competitive sector. (The share of this part is 
decided by the carrying capacity of the ecosystems.) 
Rosa Luxemburg said at that time that the natural ch racter of the capital is 
expansion. And when all the white spots will disappear on the world map, namely 
the expansion will be limited, something must be happened. And the first world war 
broke out. Wars, time by time unleashed by the Americans can be viewed as susch 
expansions, but this holds true for the enlargements of he European Union as well 
(which are by no means expressions of sympathy of the citizens of Northern and 
Western Europe towards the newly acceeding countries). (But the above mentioned 
analogy of water containing vessels by Jánossy also c n be adopted to this situation.) 
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Theoretically there is a possibility for the capital to expand not in an extensive 
way (occupying new territories and resources), but increasing output from the same 
amount of inputs, developing technology and improving efficiency. But in this case 
it is the new consumer markets which are lacking... (Life is so complicated, but 
everything would be simple if the Say dogma was viable. Namely: that every 
production creates its market.) 
The US objects to any element of a climate policy which involves in some 
way or another a kind of limitation (in resource use, pollution emission, 
consumption decrease). The Americans want to do something in favour of the 
climate and not not-doing: plant forests, improve rsources efficiency by 
technological development, replace fossil fuels by renewables, etc25. 
In principle, the economy may develop dinamically even at stable or 
decreasing energy and resource supply26. But there are too many escapes. (Let us 
take the case of the new oil deposits to be exploited soon under the ice of the Nordic 
See; it is made possible by the climate change itself!) If scarecity occured in fossil 
fuels, with oil prices permanently increasing and costs of substitutes remained very 
high (including the different, environment frinedly uses of coal), it would be easy to 
take global climate stabilization measures. But amidst of energy abundancy it is 
practically impossible. 
4. Is there a green way out of the crisis? 
Soon after the financial crisis had broken out, a new idea appeared, how to save 
capitalism: the idea of Green Rescue, green energy revolution. UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon called the cause „a green New Dal that would rebuild and 
reshape the economy of planet Earth in ways reminisce t of the programs that 
President Franklin Roosevelt used to revitalize the economy of the United States 
during the Great Depression” (Dickey–McNicoll 2008). The great political leaders 
of the world have taken up this cause: British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy and – at that time presidential candidate – Barack 
Obama agreed with connecting the necessity of fightin  climate change and 
combatting the economic crisis. Obama promised to invest strategically $150 bn 
over 10 years in a clean energy-economy, help the private sector to create 5 mn new 
green jobs, to manufacture plug-in hybrid cars, to invest in renewable energy 
projects, to enhance energy efficiency, to develop low-emission coal plants, next 
generation of bio-fuels, etc. The Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso talked of „a 
great opportunity for new growth” and vowed that „we ill achieve the low-carbon 
                                                   
25 The production of biofuels is reaching very high levels in America. This was one of the reasons of 
the food crisis in the world economy at the beginning of 2008. 
26 This is the case, when the proper word to be used is „development”. „Growth” should be used for an 
economy with increasing energy and resource supply. 
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society that is compatible with growth ahead of the rest of the world”. According to 
MITI, the Japanese industrial ministry: building a new industrial infrastructure is 
needed by banking on more efficient use of energy and innovative technologies. 
Gordon Brown said that „…climate change should not m ve to the back burner of 
international concern…. I beleive the opposite is the case.”27. 
Leaders of world organisations also declared their preference towards a green 
energy revolution and combining issues of energy, climate and economic crises. 
Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank admitted that „It needs to 
interconnect energy and climate change.”... „A new multilateralism is needed.  
It should reach beyond the traditional focus on finance and trade. Energy, climate 
change and stabilizing fragile and postconflict states are economic as well as 
political issues... A newly started $6 bn World Bank program on climate 
stabilization aims at completing UN negotiations with practical projects 
(technologies, forestation and adjustment)”28. „The solution needs a globally 
coordinated crisis management package, which aims at developing the new 
generation of low consumption and low exhaustion cars and creating green jobs” 
(Kemal Dervish Chief Administrator of UNDP) (Dervis 2009). 
On the other side, no such ideas have been voiced by the most renowned 
economists, such as Stiglitz, Krugman, Summers or Phelps. Neither leading figures 
in international affairs, such as Pascal Lamy, James Wolfensohn, or George Soros 
made similar statements. 
Huge energy saving projects have been started in the Western countries, with 
a special view on insulation of buildings,where most f the savings potential lies. 
These will result hundreds of thousands of new jobs. The most ambitious 
programme of all is that of President Sarkozy, launched in October 2007. The 
„Environmental Grenelle” consists of 268 recommendations, including 40% drop of 
CO2 emission from building heating by 2020, constructing 2000 km new TGV 
tracks by 2020, charging extra tax on fossile energies and offering tax credit on 
renewables, etc. In some respects Germany is the most pr gressive country in the 
EU, with a federal scheme to insulate the entire housing stock and an investment in 
wind power which puts the UK (with far greater wind resources) to shame  
(Monbiot 2008). Germany is specially well developed in the world market of green 
technologies. 
A transformation in energy industry from fossils to renewables both could 
serve climate stabilization and giving new impetus o technological development 
that could overcome economic crisis. Historians of economics, such as Harold 
James of Princeton pointed out that each depression could be overcome by either a 
new wave of technologies or formation of new structures. The agricultural crisis in 
the 1840s was ended by the industrial revolution; the Great Depression in 1929-32 
was followed by the development of services; the big oom of the end of last 
                                                   
27 I.e. 
28 Newsweek, Special edition 2009. 
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century was a result of dotcom revolution; the lastboom was due to the financial 
innovations in the housing estates sector29. 
Despite all this, the International Energy Agency is pessimistic. In recession 
consumption and energy prices go down and that discourages the development of 
alternatives. The development of alternative energy sources would require enormous 
amount of capital, with a distant payoff. Presently, with tight capital and credit and 
low oil prices private investors do not put billions in a distant clean energy future. At 
$140 oil prices alternative programmes pay off. At $70 development of alternatives 
make less sense, at below $40 not at all. Market volatility undermines long-term 
planning. According to the calculations of the IEA to reduce carbon-dioxide 
emissions 50% lower by 2050 requires investment of $45 trillion – now! Anyhow, if 
governments are funding for banks, why not for green industry, too  
(Dickey–McNicoll 2008)? 
The US has a special interest in the green energy rvolution. Michael T. Klare 
has published an article about the topic in the Special Edition of Newsweek under 
the title: „Time to Kill the Oil Beast”. The heavy oil dependence of America might 
give an important impulse in the green overhaul of the world’s energy industry, says 
the author. The US gets 40 percent of its total energy from petroleum and 23 percent 
from dirty coal. 60 percent of America’s oil is obtained mostly from hostile 
countries. The US spends $50 bn a year in military costs on protecting its petroleum 
interests in the Middle East – yet it spends far less on trying to actively replace oil. 
Both this and a growing concern over global warming requires a large increase in 
reliance on reneable energy sources. Reducing oil’sro e as America’s primary 
energy source (from 40 to 25 percent) and increasing the share obtained from 
renewables and hydropower to the same percentage (up from from 6 percent) by 
2030 should be an ambitious goal (Klare 2009). 
If we look at the character of the stabilization policies and packages of the 
leading countries, there are no signs of such a development: the overwhelming 
majority of the public money goes for the bailing out of banks, revitalizing the 
existing structures, promoting new car purchases with scrapping old ones and the 
development of green energy and industry is only margin l so far. 
The British stabilization package is one of the world’s least green, „Britain 
has allocated 7% of total spending to environmental causes, compared with 12% in 
America and 83% in South Korea.”30 But even the Chinese spent significantly more 
on the green cause. This is, why the Economist calls it a „Keynesian splurge”. In 
absolute terms, China allocated $220 bn on low carbon investments, while America 
only $100 bn, Korea $31 bn and Germany $14 bn. 
In July 2009, Green Alliance, a British NGO published a booklet under the 
title „From crisis to recovery – New economic policies for a low carbon future” 
(Hewett 2009). In the foreword its leading idea is formulated as follows: „The initial 
                                                   
29 Figyelő, 2009. január 1-7. 
30 The Economist July 18th 2009. 
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step in response to the financial crisis, advocated by most governments around the 
world, and coordinated rather remarkably between natio s, was a major public-
spending stimulus... most if not all contained a ’green element’... But that phase is 
now over, and expecting the next wave of investment in green initiatives to come 
simply from the public purse is over-optimistic. The major investment drive for a 
low carbon economy must now come from the private sector...” The publication puts 
special emphasis on how to raise private money for greening the British economy 
and energy industry. 
Earlier, I have surveyed the opinion of leading politicians and economists of 
the world concerning the green rescue. A special notice should be made to Angela 
Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. For many years, she had been a pioneer of green 
thinking and policies, a fervent agent of climate sabilization. However, with the 
break out of economic crisis, she followed an economic stabilization policy, pushing 
green considerations completely into the background. Germany has become the dirty 
man of Europe – writes George Monbiot in Guardian, evaluating the Poznan 
conference of the UN in December 2008: „It was Merkel who demanded weaker 
standards for fuel efficiency in cars, Merkel who pushed hardest for a €40 bn bail-
out of the motor manufacturers, Merkel who now insists that the big cement, steel 
and chemicals companies are allowed to get away without paying” (Monbiot 2008). 
What are the chances of the green rescue in the long run? Are the objectives 
of reducing green house gases 50-80 per cent by the middle of the century feasible? 
Nate Lewis of the California Institute of Technology made interesting scenarios for 
2050. He supposed that world population will be 9 bn at that time, per capita world 
GDP increases on an average yearly 1,6 per cent and emissions should be decreased 
by 80 per cent. In case of a business as usual scenario present world energy use of 
14 TW should grow to 45 TW. But with an unprecedented improvement in energy 
efficiency, 500 per cent relative to current US levels worldwide, world energy claim 
would be only 28 TW. To keep to the 450 ppm of emissions’s concentration to be 
able to stabilize warming up at 2 centigrade, 26,5 TW of the 28 should be carbon 
free. So this is the task ahead of a green energy rvolution, if consumption would 
not squeeze (Lewis 2004, Begley 2009). 
One option is nuclear energy. If 10 TW of the 26,5 should be produced by 
nuclear, a new reactor should be built in every second day in the coming 40 years. 
„If you use every single breeze that blowes on land, you’ll get 10 to 15 terawatts” 
(Begley 2009). But let us be realistic. 27 per cent of he land surface is good for 
producing wind energy. From the global potential, 4 per cent of the earth’s surface 
could reasonably be used and that would provide 2 TW. o get 10 TW of solar 
energy by 2050, we would need to cover 1 million roofs with panels every day from 
now until then. As concerns biomass, its land requirement is even bigger. 20 TW by 
biomass needs 31% of total land area of the earth.31 T e main conclusion of Lewis is 
                                                   
31 Lewis gives data concerning geothermical energies and carbon sequestration as well. 
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that „It’s not true that all the technologies are available and we just need the political 
will to deploy them... we need Nobel caliber discoveries.”  
And as concerns my conclusion: maybe, there is no technologicl solution for 
the climate change. As a result: reducing energy use and consumption in general, 
becomes inevitable. And for that, the political decision would be extremely difficult. 
 
The first angel blew his trumpet, 
 and there followed hail and fire, mixed with blood,  
which fell on the earth; and a third of the earth  
was burnt up, and a third of the trees were  
burnt up, and all green grass was burnt up. 
(Revelation 8) 
5. Summary 
The leading politicians of the world are aware of the dangers and risks to be brought 
about by climate change. However, solution is made lmost impossible by the 
character of the problem: climate stabilization, as well as the climate itself, are 
global public goods. And as a rule, the phenomenon of free riding appears. Free 
riding can be managed in one country or in the frames of a regional integration, but 
not in international dimension, where enforcement is missing. This needs an 
institutional solution. Welfare economics does not provide an adequate frame to 
manage the issue because the social welfare function an only be interpreted with 
one jurisdiction and within one country. Nor discounting could be implemented in 
the long run and among different countries, and standard economics cannot manage 
risks and uncertainties to set in with climate change. Similarly, a very huge problem 
is the burden-sharing in climate mitigation, which raises responsibility for the past 
and the future, not to speak about divergent interes s and different power relations. 
All this is caused by consequentionalism, the moral b ckground of welfare 
economics and the consumer society. The solution supposes different ethics: the 
moral concept of sustainability and stewardship should rule that everybody should 
take into consideration the effects of decisions on others, the nature and the future, 
this way enabling us to follow a successful climate stabilization policy. 
In contrast to this, financial and economic crisis can be managed within the 
ruling paradigm, with the existing institutions. True, there is a contradiction between 
the overall globalization of economic and financial processes on the one side and the 
overweight of nation states in economic decisions o the other, but the activity of 
international financial organizations can be improved. Business cycles could not be 
eliminated, they are part of the system, similar to greed and and the rush for profit. 
The beleif in the allmightiness of markets has been shocked and the visible hand of 
the state now plays an important role, but after stabilization economic liberalism will 
return. The general defeat of the political left in the elections to the European 
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Parliament at the beginning of this summer is a cler proof that people do not want a 
basic change in the ruling capitalist system.  
An apparent solution would be to connect the two crises: giving a 
technological impetus and innovation to the stagnating economies by launching a 
green energy revolution, developing the renewables. No doubt, that would both help 
the economy and contribute to save the climate. However, thorough calculations 
underline, that the total energy demand of a busines  as usual extrapolation could 
not be satisfied with renewables and nuclear energy. The massive decrease of energy 
demand is inevitable. And it is difficult to imagine, how to achieve. As a result, 
unless basic scientific breakthroughs happen in energ tics, our world could not be 
saved. 
Financial and economic crises will set in time by time, they are unovidable, 
but they will be solved. Climate change will be only once, but it will not be avoided. 
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